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Intact animacy perception during 
chase detection in ASD
Steven Vanmarcke1,2, Sander van de Cruys1,2, Pieter Moors1 & Johan Wagemans1,2
We explored the strength of implicit social inferences in adolescents with and without Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD) using a chasing paradigm in which participants judged the absence/presence of a chase 
within a display of four seemingly randomly moving dots. While two of these dots always moved 
randomly, the two others could fulfill the role of being either the chasing (wolf) or chased (sheep) dot. 
In the chase-present (but not the chase-absent) trials the wolf displayed chasing behavior defined by 
the degree to which the dot reliably moved towards the sheep (chasing subtlety). Previous research 
indicated that chasing subtlety strongly influenced chase detection in typically developing (TD) 
adults. We intended to replicate and extend this finding to adolescents with and without ASD, while 
also adding either a social or a non-social cue to the displays. Our results confirmed the importance of 
chasing subtlety and indicated that adding social, but not non-social, information further improved 
chase detection performance. Interestingly, the performance of adolescents with ASD was less 
dependent on chasing subtlety than that of their TD counterparts. Nonetheless, adolescents with and 
without ASD did not differ in their use of the added social (or non-social) cue.
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) represents a broad set of early onset neurodevelopmental psychiatric disor-
ders that are characterized by two main symptom clusters. Firstly, individuals with ASD show persistent defi-
cits in reciprocal social communication and social interaction. Secondly, individuals with ASD have restricted 
and repetitive patterns of behavior, interests or activities1. These symptoms are represented by atypicalities in 
developmental areas such as speech, language, sensory processing or relationship building. Furthermore, several 
studies have found individuals with ASD to be impaired on tasks assessing their knowledge of the mental states 
of other human beings (“mentalizing”) while sparing other perceptual and cognitive abilities (for review, see2). 
Overall, these deviations in the processing of social information are in line with the Theory of Mind (ToM) 
account of ASD2,3. ToM refers to the socio-cognitive ability to infer mental states of oneself and others implicitly, 
to interpret and understand their behaviors, and to guide one’s own actions accordingly. The theory describes a 
broad cluster of socio-communicative skills, which are assumed to be generally impaired in individuals with ASD. 
One of these skills relates to the processing and/or identification of (non-)verbal communicative behaviors4,5. 
Individuals with ASD are generally found to give less preferential attention to social objects and events (e.g., 
faces, humans, and social actions)6,7. In addition, other studies observed clear emotion recognition deficits in 
individuals with ASD (compared with typically developing (TD) participants) in tasks tapping into more com-
plex socio-cognitive abilities such as the discrimination of more subtle emotional expressions8,9. Nonetheless, 
standardized, laboratory-controlled studies on social cognitive processing in ASD have yielded very inconsistent 
results due to various reasons3: (1) heterogeneity in the tested participant samples, (2) large stimulus and task 
variability making across-study generalization difficult, and (3) ambiguous experimental ToM designs allowing 
for non-social heuristics to solve the given task.
The discrepancy between intact or minimally impaired ToM task performance and impaired social adaptation 
observed in more naturalistic settings10,11 suggests that we need to develop alternative ToM operationalizations 
that can measure social deficits more sensitively. In the current study, we will therefore focus on a well-controlled, 
promising paradigm, using animated displays consisting of simple moving shapes, which appear to engage in ani-
mate and goal-directed behavior when presented to observers12,13. This automatic and effortless percept of shapes 
as interacting in social relationships is termed animacy perception and the interpretation of entities as intentional 
agents represents a constitutive component of the ability to spontaneously grasp social meanings14. In ASD, com-
pared to TD participants, the subjective evaluation of animacy-relevant physical stimulus properties seems intact 
(e.g., observing trial-by-trial variations in motion complexity), while spontaneous neural responses to social 
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cues, related to intrinsic salience and mentalistic inferences, are diminished15. Furthermore, previous research16–18 
indicated that individuals with ASD used shorter, and less complex, verbal descriptions of social elements in ani-
mated displays of simple moving shapes similar to those pioneered by Heider and Simmel12. These results suggest 
that individuals with ASD appear to have problems in correctly describing the object- or goal-directedness of 
the observed activity. This was also evident in reduced monitoring of, and responsivity to, social cues signaling 
goal-directedness in children with ASD19, even when these cues were generated by simple, moving, geometric 
shapes depicting social interactions20. Nonetheless, these findings in participants with ASD did not result from 
poorer perceptual representations of other people’s actions due to dysfunctional visual circuitry, but from atten-
tional atypicalities when processing socially relevant stimuli21. They were not restricted to social attention but also 
involved domain-general attention problems22, possibly related to a tendency to perseverate on images/situations 
of interest, exploring them in a more detail-oriented manner23.
Importantly, these differences in social attention between individuals with or without ASD often remain subtle 
and only become more prominent in more automatic, implicit measurements of attentional priority for social or 
non-social cues in naturalistic visual information24. Problematically, most studies using animated displays in ASD 
still focus on verbal self-report, requiring active self-reflection and conscious semantic labeling to complete the 
task, while not probing more implicit measures of agency detection25. Such a distinction between implicit and 
explicit forms of mentalizing has played a crucial role in clarifying the deficits in social cognition that occur in 
ASD. More specifically, we can hypothesize that individuals with ASD may deviate from typical social cognition 
in that mental states are not as readily experienced ‘directly’ (i.e., as given in our perceptual experience of others’ 
behavior), but rather that awareness of others’ mental states tends to require the (explicit) interpretation or rea-
soning that TD individuals usually reserve for social situations that are unusually ambiguous26,27. Such an inter-
pretation is in line with ToM and, more recently, the Enactive Mind (EM) hypothesis28. This hypothesis argues 
that the process of acquiring embodied social cognition is derailed in the early development of children with 
ASD, due to a reduced salience of social stimuli and concomitant enactment of socially irrelevant aspects of the 
environment. Interestingly, previous studies found that children with ASD, compared to their TD counterparts, 
have a lower tendency to gaze at faces, e.g during free play29,30, and spend more time watching objects within the 
environment31. More recently, it was also reported that children with ASD directed their gaze further down and 
explored their lateral field of view more extensively than TD children32. In addition, a recent study noted that 
interactive and dynamic stimuli might be better than static displays to predict how children behave in real-life 
situations33. The authors thereby reasoned that human figures or faces, depicted in isolation, are only ‘social’ in the 
sense that they represent social beings, but not in terms of depicting (realistic) social behavior. Reduced attention 
to social interactions, in the presence of relatively intact ‘social attention’ to static or even dynamic individual 
faces, might suggest a greater deficit in attending to social actions rather than just social beings.
In order to further explore these implicit differences in social attention, we used a dynamic chase detection 
paradigm, similar to the paradigm of Gao and colleagues13 in TD participants, in which we specifically investi-
gated the strength of implicit social inferences in adolescents with and without ASD. In this task, one geometrical 
shape (referred to as ‘wolf ’) is chasing another (referred to as ‘sheep’), and this chasing behavior was defined by 
the degree to which the wolf reliably moved in the direction of the sheep, mimicking or deviating from perfectly 
‘heat-seeking’ behavior by manipulating the maximal angular deviation of the heading of the wolf (chasing sub-
tlety). Findings in TD participants indicated that this cue strongly determined chase detection performance and 
that, when the wolf ’s motion only deviates slightly from perfect heat-seeking, chase detection already becomes 
much harder. Note that the perception of chasing of the sheep by the wolf is a spontaneous interpretation of 
animacy, agency and intentionality, which is based on the relative spatio-temporally defined trajectories between 
dots that are inherently inanimate. In the case of random, independent trajectories, all dots are perceived as ran-
domly moving entities. In the case of a chase trial, the two trajectories that are yoked are automatically perceived 
as animate agents, one intentionally chasing the other. It is this automatic social interpretation of two interde-
pendent trajectories which is interesting as a case of spontaneous social interpretations while not strictly being 
necessary to carry out the task.
Furthermore, in a follow-up study34 the authors assessed, by interrupting the wolf ’s chasing behavior period-
ically by different types of non-chasing motion, how (1) the detection of chasing is determined by the character 
and temporal grouping of ‘pursuit’ over time and (2) how these temporal dynamics can lead the visual system 
to either construct or actively reject interpretations of chasing. They concluded that the subtlety of the stimulus 
features that modulated agency detection in this task indicated that our awareness of animacy is not necessarily 
dependent on the conscious, deliberate appraisal of the stimuli, but is instead a purely perceptual process35. In 
our study, we intended to replicate the findings of Gao and colleagues13 on the influence of chasing subtlety on 
chase detection in TD participants (baseline condition). In this baseline condition, participants had to judge the 
absence or presence of a chase within a display of four seemingly randomly moving dots. While two of these 
dots always moved randomly, the two others could fulfill the role of being either the chasing (wolf) or chased 
(sheep) dot. More precisely, in the chase-present (but not the chase-absent) trials, the wolf displayed chasing 
behavior defined by the degree to which the dot reliably moved towards the sheep (chasing subtlety). Next to this 
baseline condition, in which we only manipulated chasing subtlety, we included (1) a social condition, in which 
eyes were added to all shapes and those of the wolf were always oriented towards the sheep, and (2) a non-social 
condition, in which wolf and sheep synchronously changed color (for example, see Fig. 1). While this social con-
dition remained similar to previous orientation manipulations (e.g., whether and how the shapes, usually arrows, 
faced each other in the chasing display) (for review, see35), the non-social condition was an entirely new stimulus 
manipulation. Both conditions provided additional, meaningful information on the presence/absence of a chase, 
which we could compare to the baseline condition where the interdependency of the spatio-temporal trajectories 
of two dots was the only stimulus cue available. Whether the spontaneous perception of the interdependency 
as a social act of chasing also helps is not really known. By adding the eyes we could explicitly test the role of 
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Figure 1. (A) Graphical overview of the trial design. (B) Static screen shots of the different task conditions. 
In the baseline condition, only the chasing subtlety was manipulated. In the social condition, eyes were added 
to all shapes and those of the wolf were always focused on the sheep in chase-present trials. In the non-
social condition, the contrast of the shapes was manipulated periodically. A movie of the task is available on 
http://www.gestaltrevision.be/en/resources/supplementary-material. (C) Illustration of the chasing subtlety 
manipulation, implemented by manipulating the maximal angular deviation of the heading of the wolf 
compared to perfect “heat-seeking” behavior. When the chasing subtlety was 15° (or 45° or 75°), the wolf was 
always heading in the general direction of the sheep, but was not perfectly heat-seeking. The dot could move in 
any direction within a 30° (or 90° or 150°) window, with the window always centered on the (moving) sheep.
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social interpretations, which we could compare to the baseline condition with only spontaneous, implicit social 
interpretation and to the non-social condition where the chase was cued differently. By these comparisons, we 
wanted to test whether animacy perception occurs automatically and reflects visual processing specialized for the 
extraction of animacy from visual motion rather than more conscious, higher-level interpretations35. We thereby 
predicted that TD participants would perform better when adding a socially-salient (e.g., eyes), compared to a 
less socially-salient (e.g., color change), cue to the display, due to the stronger social saliency of the interacting 
objects in this social condition. Finally, we were also interested in determining (1) whether adolescents with ASD, 
who display problems in social adaptation in everyday life, would perform worse than TD adolescents in a task 
using an implicit measure of agency detection and (2) whether adolescents with ASD would make use of social or 
non-social cues to the same extent as TD adolescents. Based on previous research19,21, we predicted that adoles-
cents with ASD, compared to TD adolescents, would show less spontaneous responsivity to the socially-relevant 
information during chase detection. As a result, although we expected adolescents with ASD already to perform 
worse during implicit agency detection, this difference was assumed to be larger when adding the social, but not 
the non-social, cue to the chasing display.
Results
The GLMM analysis (for parameter estimates and 95% confidence intervals, see Table 1) indicated a significant 
main effect of Subtlety (Z = −11.54; p < 0.001). This showed that all participants were better at the task when 
the maximal angular deviation of the heading of the wolf was smaller or closer to perfect heat-seeking behav-
ior (Fig. 2). This was a replication of previous findings underlining the influence of chasing subtlety on chase 
detection performance13. Furthermore, we also found a significant main effect, compared to the baseline con-
dition, of adding social information to the display (Z = 6.11; p < 0.001). We did not find a main effect of adding 
non-social information to the display (Z = 1.20; p = 0.23). Furthermore, we observed a significant main effect 
of Group (Z = −2.06; p = 0.04), combined with a significant Group x Subtlety (Z = −1.97; p = 0.05) interaction 
effect. This interaction (Fig. 2D) indicated that adolescents with ASD performed worse than TD adolescents when 
the chase display closely resembled perfect heat-seeking behavior (e.g., 15°), while the opposite pattern emerged 
(ASD > TD) when the maximal angular deviation of the heading of the chasing dot became larger (e.g., 75°). 
More concretely, when also taking the main effect of Group into account, the model specifically indicated that 
the adolescents with ASD performed worse at a chasing subtlety of 15°, similar at 45° and better at 75° than TD 
adolescents. This means that the performance of adolescents with ASD depended less on chasing subtlety than 
that of their TD counterparts. Interestingly, we did not observe a significant Group x Condition interaction (not 
withheld during GLMM model selection, see Supplementary materials). This indicated that adolescents with and 
without ASD did not differ in their use of the added social or non-social cues.
Finally, we found a significant influence of Age (Z = 2.61; p = 0.01) on participant performance (Fig. 3). 
This indicated that the chase detection of older adolescents, with and without ASD, was better than that of their 
younger counterparts. None of the other participant or task characteristics elicited an improvement in predicting 
chase detection performance.
Discussion
The first goal of our study was to replicate the findings of Gao and colleagues13 on animacy perception in TD 
participants. In line with this study, our results indicated that chasing subtlety strongly affected chase detection 
performance. This could be interpreted as evidence for animacy perception to occur automatically and to reflect 
visual processing (rather than more conscious, higher-level interpretations) specialized for the extraction of ani-
macy from visual motion (for review, see35). More generally, the authors emphasized that the purpose of vision 
is not only to recover the physical structure of the local environment, but also to recover its causal (and social) 
structure36. This was in accordance with the idea that not only physical properties of objects are accessed directly 
(and automatically) by perceptual processes, but also their intentional and/or social properties37. Furthermore, 
as an extension of the research of Gao and colleagues13, we found that chasing performance only improved when 
a perceptually-salient social cue, but not when a less perceptually-salient, or less naturalistic, non-social cue, 
was added to the task. This indicated a strict dependency of animacy perception on subtle visual display details, 
RT
Parameter
Estimate 
(Standard Error) p-value
95% confidence 
interval
Intercept −1.13 (0.98) 0.25 [−3.05; 0.79]
Group −0.39 (0.19) 0.04 [−0.76; −0.02]
Age 0.17 (0.07) 0.01 [0.03; 0.31]
Trial type (chase-
absent/present) 0.23 (0.14) 0.09 [−0.04; 0.50]
Subtlety −0.05 (4.38 * 10−3) <0.001 [−0.06; −0.04]
Social Condition 0.66 (0.11) <0.001 [0.44; 0.88]
Non-social Condition 0.15 (0.13) 0.23 [−0.11; 0.41]
Group x Subtlety 0.01 (5.10 * 10−3) 0.05 [4.00 * 10−6; 02]
Table 1. Overview of the parameter estimates for the chase detection task for the random intercepts logistic 
regression analysis on the trial-by-trial accuracy data.
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which were hypothesized to be most effective when automatically reinforcing the social saliency of the interacting 
objects (e.g., eyes).
All participants, with and without ASD, were able to successfully perform the chase detection task. 
Furthermore, no significant group-level differences were found with regard to the overall performance pattern 
when comparing the three separate conditions with each other (Baseline, Social and Non-social Condition). This 
was in contradiction with our initial hypothesis, expecting adolescents with ASD, compared to TD participants, 
(1) to perform worse in a task using an implicit measure of agency detection and (2) to use the added social 
(e.g., eyes) or non-social (e.g., color change) information differently. Interestingly, we did observe that the chase 
detection performance of adolescents with ASD was less dependent on chasing subtlety than that of their TD 
counterparts.
Figure 2. Overview of the mean accuracy performance. The data are represented as the mean performance 
across participants, with error bars depicting the standard error of the mean (SEM). The data of (A) the baseline 
condition, (B) the social condition, (C) the non-social condition and (D) all conditions combined, each time 
presented for all three subtlety values (15°, 45°, 75°). TD adolescents are depicted in blue and adolescents with 
ASD in green.
Figure 3. Visualization of the data, with the linear (per group) regression line indicating the strength of 
the correlation between the mean accuracy (%) on the ordinate axis and age (in years) on the abscissa. TD 
adolescents are depicted in blue and adolescents with ASD in green.
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Chase detection as animacy perception. The absence of group-level differences in the use of additional 
non-motion cues indicated that adolescents with and without ASD were similarly responsive to the increased 
perception of animacy when adding ‘relevant’ social information. This might be explained by recent evidence, 
suggesting that the perceptual system of individuals with ASD returns functionally intact signals for interpreting 
goal-directed actions adequately, especially when these individuals are prompted and motivated to do so under 
controlled conditions21,38. Furthermore, the added social cue might have been interpreted as perceptually salient, 
and reliable, low-level stimulus information by individuals with ASD39. Using a more detailed attention-focused 
processing of the local (or dot) chase elements, coinciding or following an integration of the different dot tra-
jectories (e.g., wolf and sheep), they might have been able to detect the matching changes in the environment 
(‘eye’ direction and dot movement) as meaningful low-level stimulus information. This could have allowed them 
to largely overcome their, compared to TD individuals, reduced spontaneous responsivity to socially-relevant 
information in this task21,40. The absence of a chase detection advantage in the non-social condition for ado-
lescents with ASD could then be explained by the less perceptually-salient nature of the color change manip-
ulation. Furthermore, we did observe that the performance of adolescents with ASD depended less on chasing 
subtlety than that of their TD counterparts. The (slightly) better performance of TD adolescents in trials closely 
resembling perfect heat-seeking behavior, could indicate that the TD adolescents still had a stronger spontane-
ous interpretation of animacy than the adolescents with ASD. With higher chasing subtlety, the implicit social 
interpretation of the chase display lost its saliency and a more attention-focused processing of the chase elements 
gradually became a better search strategy. This could explain why individuals with ASD were better than the TD 
adolescents in the more difficult chase detection trials (75°). To conclude this section, if indeed the chasing task 
is a good implicit measure of spontaneous social inference as argued by Gao and colleagues13, intact performance 
in ASD seems inconsistent with cognitive accounts of ASD centering on impaired (implicit) social cognition2.
Chase detection as visual search. An alternative interpretation of these findings relates to recent evidence 
suggesting that chase detection is not effortless41,42. More precisely, these studies argued that chase detection 
requires an object-based attentional selection of chase-relevant stimulus information with clear performance 
costs when, e.g., increasing the set size of the chasing display or manipulating the usefulness of spatial proximity 
between wolf and sheep to evaluate chase presence/absence. Interestingly, in these studies, observers were found 
not to select pairs of objects during chase detection, but to evaluate the motion pattern of a single object to decide 
whether or not it was involved in a chase. This made the authors conclude that chase detection requires an effort-
ful, item-by-item, visual search through the subsets of all possible items in the display. As a consequence, the 
chase detection paradigm would be mostly comparable with a visual conjunction search task, in which focused 
visual attention is needed to serially scan and integrate the display elements into a consistent whole (object)43,44. 
To correctly detect the presence/absence of a chase, participants have to combine motion and stimulus (eyes, 
color change) information effectively. Within this interpretation of our findings, it might be that our ‘social’ and 
‘non-social’ display manipulation mainly differed in terms of perceptual saliency and not in terms of social mean-
ingfulness. The absence of a condition-specific group-level difference in performance could therefore indicate 
that the three conditions did not strongly differ in search difficulty, although the so-called ‘social’ condition was 
easier due to the extra perceptually-salient cue information. Furthermore, the weaker dependency on chasing 
subtlety in ASD might relate to their enhanced performance in complex visual search tasks45,46. As in visual 
search, the enhanced performance in ASD became especially apparent in the more difficult chase detection tri-
als. This further argued for an item-by-item search through the different elements of the chase display, instead 
of an automatic processing of the social saliency of the interacting objects. This explanation of intact (or even 
improved) chase detection in terms of perceptual and attentional mechanisms may be consistent with accounts 
of ASD that assume improved sensitivity for local deviations39, although the extent to which the task can be 
performed on purely local grounds still merits further investigation. One such local, non-social cue might be 
the inter-object spacing between chaser and chasee41,47. During a chase, the distance between the pair of chasing 
objects decreases relative to the non-chasing objects (even at larger subtleties). Individuals with ASD might be 
more sensitive to this type of spatial proximity cue than their TD counterparts (making them perform better than 
their TD counterparts during chase detection with higher chasing subtleties).
Finally, another explanation for why chasing subtlety could work differently between the two groups is based 
on the rationality principle48. It states that, to be perceived as animate and goal-directed, an agent needs to achieve 
a goal with maximum efficiency. This can explain why an observer detects chasing only when the wolf pursuits the 
sheep with heat-seeking motion, persistently over time. Following this rationality principle, one should readily 
detect small subtlety values but ignore larger subtlety values. Hence, better performance of the ASD group in the 
high subtlety condition may suggest that their perceived chasing is less constrained by the rationality principle.
Future research. The intact performance of adolescents with ASD in this task seemed inconsistent with 
cognitive accounts of ASD centering on impaired (implicit) social cognition. We were therefore not able to 
make strong claims about the chasing task as being a good implicit measure of spontaneous social inference 
as argued by Gao and colleagues13. However, the social and the non-social conditions in our study might differ 
in other aspects than the intended ones. For instance, the ‘eyes’ of the wolf provide a constant pointer towards 
the sheep whereas the simultaneous sinusoidal color changes in the non-social condition do not provide such 
spatial information. Future research using the current chase detection paradigm should therefore also test dif-
ferent, less spatially-defined, manipulations of social saliency (e.g., restricting the differences between the social 
and non-social chase detection to the cover story, providing a socially-salient versus socially-neutral chasing 
background,…). Furthermore, previous research indicated that measuring eye movements during chase detec-
tion (or other animated displays) could provide useful (and implicit) tools to systematically assess the degree 
of mental state attribution in different social versus non-social experimental conditions while taking low-level 
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kinematic confounds (e.g., the low-level physical stimulus properties of the different experimental conditions) 
into account49,50. Future research may also benefit from using irrelevant and informative chase detection cues, 
each with varying reliabilities, in order to better approach naturalistic social settings that usually cause problems 
in ASD51. Deciphering the stimuli and/or display properties influencing the presence and strength of implicit 
social inferences within such a laboratory-controlled experimental setting could then provide meaningful 
insights to identify the corresponding characteristics of complex everyday life situations. This translation from 
abstract, laboratory-controlled, experiments to rich social scenes, involving multiple concurrent salient cues, 
as in eye contact and communicative interaction, could be especially important to better understand the social 
problems encountered in ASD33,52.
Conclusion
In this study we intended to explore the strength of implicit social inferences in adolescents with and without ASD 
using a chasing paradigm, similar to Gao and colleagues13, in which participants judged the absence or presence 
of a chase within a display of seemingly random moving dots. Our results indicated that, in line with the original 
findings, chasing subtlety strongly affected chase detection performance. Furthermore, we also found that chase 
detection only improved when we added social, but not non-social, information to the display. Interestingly, 
adolescents with and without ASD did not differ in their use of the added social (or non-social) cue. However, the 
chase detection performance of the adolescents with ASD was intact and depended less on chasing subtlety than 
that of their TD counterparts. This may relate to differences in visual search performance, which plays a stronger 
role in the more challenging (high chasing subtlety) search displays.
Methods and materials
Participants. A group of 24 adolescents (20 males) with ASD (mean age = 14.08; SD = 1.47) and a TD con-
trol group (mean age = 14.33; SD = 1.27), which were individually matched on age, gender and IQ, participated 
in this study (see Table 2 for participant characteristics). IQ was estimated using an abbreviated four-subtest 
(Vocabulary, Similarities, Picture Completion and Block Design) version of the WISC-III53,54. All participants 
also completed the Dutch Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS) questionnaire55 to get an overall estimation of indi-
vidual and/or group-level differences in ASD traits.
The adolescents with ASD all had a formal clinical diagnosis of ASD and were diagnosed according to 
DSM-IV-TR criteria56 in a multidisciplinary team. Recruitment was set up via the Autism Expertise Centre of the 
University Hospital in Leuven. Furthermore, a trained clinical psychologist administered the Dutch version of the 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule 2 (ADOS-2) module 3 from all participants with a clinical diagnosis. 
ASD diagnoses were re-confirmed in 22 of the 24 adolescents, with the new ADOS Algorithm for DSM-IV/ICD-
10 (ADOS-2). Since the analyses did not differ depending on whether we in- or excluded the participants scoring 
below the ADOS-2 cut-off score, we followed the clinical diagnosis of the participants and reported the results of 
the full ASD group. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
The study was approved by the Medical Ethics Commission of KU Leuven and all participants, and their 
parents, provided written informed consent before onset of the experiment. Furthermore, our study was per-
formed in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and written informed consent was obtained according to 
institutional guidelines of the local research ethics committee. All the participants were debriefed and thanked 
following their participation.
Stimuli and procedure. Participants were seated at 57 cm from the calibrated (gamma corrected) computer 
monitor (resolution: 1920 × 1200; refresh rate: 60 Hz; type: Monitor DELL U2410) in a dimly lit room. The task 
took about 30 minutes, all instructions were provided on the computer screen, and every trial started with a 
2-second countdown before the actual chasing display was presented. This display contained four identical mov-
ing circular shapes (apparent size: 1° of visual angle), shown for 3000 ms. At the start of each trial, three of the 
four shapes (dots) started moving at a constant speed of 14.5°/s and moved haphazardly by randomly changing 
direction within a 120° window (approximately every 170 ms). The fourth, and final, dot was termed the ‘wolf ’ 
and moved differently. More precisely, the heading of the wolf towards the sheep was manipulated by altering its 
maximal angular deviation compared to perfect “heat-seeking” behavior (chasing subtlety). We implemented 
three different chasing subtleties: 15°, 45°, and 75°. When the chasing subtlety was 15° (or 45° or 75°), for instance, 
the wolf was always heading in the general direction of the sheep, but was not perfectly heat-seeking. The dot 
could move in any direction within a 30° (or 90° or 150°) window, with the window always centered on the (mov-
ing) sheep. In chase-absent trials this wolf chased an invisible fifth dot, the sheep, while in chase-present trials the 
Variable TD adolescents ASD adolescents TD vs ASD Effect size
Age 14.08 (1.47) 14.33 (1.27) F1,46 = 0.40; p = 0.53 η2 = 0.01
Full-Scale IQ 103.44 (10.23) 105.63 (9.05) F1,46 = 0.62; p = 0.44 η2 = 0.01
Verbal IQ 102.38 (15.76) 105.96 (7.53) F1,46 = 1.01; p = 0.32 η2 = 0.02
Performal IQ 107.29 (15.37) 105.29 (13.28) F1,46 = 0.23; p = 0.63 η2 < 0.01
SRS (Overall) 81.04 (12.97) 49.67 (8.07) F1,46 = 101.22; p < 0.001 η
2 = 0.69
Table 2. Overview of the average group-level performance (SD between brackets), for participants with ASD 
(n = 24) and TD participants (n = 24). On each of the descriptive tests a one-way ANOVA, with Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons when required, with Group as between-participants factor was conducted.
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wolf chased one of the three visible dots (in the role of sheep) on the screen. These trajectories were generated so 
that the wolf-sheep distance always exceeded 5°. In order to retain this minimum distance, the wolf maintained 
its direction of motion in those instances in which a direction change would result in a violation of the wolf-sheep 
minimum distance (similar to47). The same behavior was also shown by the other shapes in the display when 
they had to avoid a ‘collision’ with another shape (objects were not allowed to hit, or to cross, each other). As a 
result, the movement pattern of the wolf was very similar to that of the other shapes and only differed slightly 
in the amount of direction changes (due to the larger space restriction with regard to the sheep). Furthermore, 
the chasing behavior of the wolf was delayed for 170 ms at the start of each trial (allowing the wolf to follow a 
more natural – less ‘bumpy’ or curved – chasing pattern). As a result, the only factor that differed between the 
chase-absent and chase-present trials was whether the sheep being chased was visible in the display or not. At the 
end of each trial (after the 3-second animation), the shapes disappeared from the screen and the participant was 
required, without time constraints, to indicate whether or not the trial contained a chase. If participants correctly 
identified a chase-present display, they also indicated where the sheep was last seen in the display by clicking on 
one of the four quadrants of the computer screen. This was done to motivate the adolescent participants not to 
guess or respond randomly during the chase detection task and was not intended to be included in the formal 
analysis afterwards given the very imprecise nature (e.g., screen quadrants) of the dot localization.
All participants had to complete three blocks (conditions) presented in a counterbalanced order: In the base-
line condition we only manipulated the chasing subtlety. In the social condition, all three chasing subtleties were 
also present, but eyes were added to the shapes and the eyes of the wolf were always oriented towards the sheep 
in the case of chase-present trials. Finally, in the non-social condition, in addition to the chasing subtlety, we 
sinusoidally varied the color of the shapes (with a phase offset of 0.15 radians and an amplitude of 1). For the 
chase-present trials the frequency of the color change of the wolf and the sheep was the same (3 Hz), while the 
color of the two distractor dots in the display varied at a different frequency (0.5 Hz). All participants completed 
75 trials per condition (25 per chasing subtlety, of which 20 chase-present and 5 chase-absent trials). Each con-
dition started with a total of 6 practice trials, both a chasing-present and -absent trial for each chasing subtlety, 
with visual feedback.
Analyses. We analyzed the accuracy (correct/incorrect) scores using General Linear Mixed Modeling 
(GLMM)57 and, based on the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, we chose to use a logistic regression 
modelling approach (for an overview, see Supplementary materials). After model selection, the individual predic-
tive value of each selected parameter was tested using Wald Z-tests58. Participant was always regarded as random 
intercept and both participant (e.g., FSIQ, SRS and age) and task (e.g., test order and trial type (chase-absent ver-
sus chase-present trials)) characteristics were tested as possible covariates. The results of this analysis are reported 
in the results section of the manuscript and more details on the model selection process, in terms of fixed effects 
and goodness-of-fit measures, are provided in the Supplementary materials. Furthermore, we also evaluated pos-
sible group-level differences by calculating both the mean accuracy and sensitivity (d’) values for each of the 
participants as a dependent variable in a mixed ANOVA with Group (ASD versus TD) as between-subjects factor, 
Condition (baseline, social, non-social) and Subtlety (15°, 45°, 75°) as within-subjects factors and Participants as 
a random factor. The mixed ANOVA analysis of both the mean accuracy and the d’ values provided very similar 
results as the GLMM approach. Furthermore, given the low amount of False Alarms (FA) trials per participant 
in each subtlety and condition, the calculation of the FA ratio was conducted using different averaging criteria 
(for overview, see Supplementary materials), which were found to affect the calculation of the d’ prime values. 
We therefore decided only to report the GLMM outcomes and to include all other results (ANOVA on mean 
accuracy, d’) in the Supplementary materials. All analysis were conducted using the statistical software programs 
R (version 3.1.1) and IBM SPSS (version 22).
Data availability statement. The datasets generated during and/or analyzed during the current study are 
available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.
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